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I would like to offer you today what some would consider a 
cynical view or a cynical perspective. The reason is to alert you to 
the hurdles and difficulties that one faces in the field of international 
criminal justice because to truly be an idealist, you have to know 
what the hurdles are and learn how to overcome them.  Otherwise, 
you become an ineffective idealist.   
When I was first appointed Chairman of the Security Council 
Commission and had the pleasure of meeting Professor David 
Scheffer, we were running into a lot of obstacles, most of which 
were coming from the U.N. bureaucracy.  And at the beginning, I 
was convinced that this was a product of a mastermind conspiracy, 
until one of my fellow workers who had been at the U.N. for a long 
time said, “You really don’t need to think of conspiracies when you 
have the U.N. bureaucracy to deal with.  It is capable of creating all 
of the hurdles of whatever conspiracy you can imagine and even 
more.”  And so I spent the next two years having to deal with the 
budgetary difficulties and the authorizations and the issuances of 
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contracts and things which you all deal with and which are such 
significant impediments to an effective functioning of it.   
Suddenly you find yourself, notwithstanding all of your good 
intentions and your good will in making the tribunal work, trying to 
advance the cases, cases that are taking an inordinate amount of 
time, with the tribunals getting blamed for their high costs and their 
slowness.  Then it’s time to close the circle and come back to the 
conspiracy theory and say, well, maybe there was some method to 
the madness of those who are doing that because you know, when 
you ultimately come back and you say, all right, let’s look at these 
tribunals over the last few years and how many people have been 
indicted and how many of them have been convicted; what is the 
average length of a case and how much does it cost, and you say it 
costs an average of ten million dollars to prosecute a person.  Big 
question mark—how long is international criminal justice law going 
to continue? So you not only have the questions, at what price is 
international criminal justice and what is the effectiveness of it, but 
you also have those big questions about time and cost.   
At which point I, having completed my various U.N. 
assignments, thought maybe I’ll engage in an academic exercise of 
trying to find out what really happened in the field of conflicts since 
the end of World War II.  And I went to a number of databases 
showing the number of conflicts and the number of victimizations, 
none of which were very satisfactory.  Probably the best one is at the 
University of Michigan, which is working with a project in Sweden.  
It’s understandable that you have difficulty in determining 
particularly the number of victims or contexts of different conflicts 
and also the legal characterization of the conflict so that you know 
under which category you’re going to put them.   
To give you a little bit of the raw data: after two and a half 
years of research with forty-three researchers working on five 
regions in the world, we came up with an estimate of 313 conflicts 
that took place in the world from 1948 to 2008, with a total number 
of victims—92 million people.  You’ve got to stop and think—92 
million people killed.  Comparatively, that’s twice as many people 
killed as in World Wars I and II put together.  You sort of shift back 
from reading the hard data to something else and the something else 
that came to my mind is, whatever happened to the “never again?”  
You sort of do a psychological double take and you say, wait a 
minute.  We just finished World War II and suddenly as of 1948 we 
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have 313 conflicts, 92 million people dead, twice as many as World 
Wars I and II put together.   
What did that produce?  Did we reach something Professor 
Scheffer has been actively working on, namely, the responsibility to 
protect and thus some action, some intervention?  What’s the record 
of the Security Council?  How many people were prosecuted? And I 
thought of asking a few more questions to our team of researchers.  I 
said, “Let me ask you a general question.  What did states in which 
these conflicts occurred do?”  Our common experience would tell 
you that most states did nothing.  But I said, let me try to prove it.  
And one of the indicia was that 127 countries had the audacity of 
passing general amnesty orders.  And this was open and above 
board, unabashed.  You know, wipe the slate clean—nobody 
committed any crime, no responsibility.  You look at the rest and 
you start seeing selective prosecutions as you have seen in 
Argentina, or in Chile.  And a thought came to my mind, “Well, let’s 
get a few sociologists and statisticians together and say—assuming 
we had 92 million people killed and 313 conflicts over a 60-year 
period, how many people would it take to kill 92 million people?”     
So the statisticians went back and forth and it went from one 
to three million people, and they took as a model both Nazi Germany 
and the USSR and said: if you have a certain genocide that involves 
the entire bureaucracy, such as the Nazis, you required a lot of 
people.  But in a situation like Rwanda, yes, you required a lot of 
people as individuals but you’re not involving an entire bureaucracy 
because no bureaucracy for all practical purposes existed.  It was not 
an institutionalized system of violence within a bureaucratic 
system—it was institutionalized within a movement more than 
anything else.  Suddenly the sociologists gave them all sorts of 
distinctions as to how you’re going to classify these types of 
collective manifestations of violence.  I said, all right.  Let me settle 
for one million.  That is a minimum figure we’re not going to 
dispute.   
And then we started looking actually at what I call the 
incongruities of international humanitarian law.  
If you’re Hamas, and you’re trapped in Gaza and you have 
no way of leaving, and Israel has planes and tanks, what is the only 
weapon you can have?  You can send suicide bombers, kill civilians, 
and send crude rockets, no matter where they land.  That is the only 
way you’re going to be able to respond to your opponent in any 
manner, whether it’s meaningful or not meaningful is not the 
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question.  And then you find that in addition to that, you’re dealing 
basically with people who engage in violence, who are not state 
actors, and who in addition to having to redress the military 
imbalance in the asymmetry of power, need to redress also the 
financial imbalance or economic imbalance.  In other words, they 
need to fund their activities.  And how are they going to fund their 
activities?   
And suddenly you see a shifting of the gears which 
international criminal law does not recognize, from the combatant in 
the theoretically pure sense of the word to those who engage in 
organized crime.  It becomes an organized crime activity 
indispensible to the funding of their activities.  At which point you 
realize when you start sorting through these conflicts, that it’s not 
that clear when these people started as genuine, ideologically 
motivated non-state actors and when they shifted to be a part of 
organized crime or whether it is the other way around.  Charles 
Taylor wound up being a head of state claiming to be involved in 
some type of armed conflict, but in reality he started simply in 
organized crime activity.  At what point are you going to distinguish 
Hamas as a genuine national liberation group fighting for whatever 
Marxist ideals they have, and at what point do you distinguish them 
as the protectors of the trafficking and drugs business in Gaza?   
Now, their argument is that they need to do that in order to 
support their ideologically motivated military campaign, but the 
moment you get the mixture of that, you suddenly realize, wait a 
minute—if nothing else, international law in general, and 
international criminal law in particular, is woefully deficient because 
what it does is it compartmentalizes conduct without realizing that in 
reality there is no such compartmentalization.   
You suddenly realize, we’re getting back to the old theory of 
conspiracy here.  Is there really some method to the madness of the 
international legislative process?  Is it purposely designed or built to 
fail?  Well, it’s not really built to fail, but it’s built to work 
inefficiently in order to create wiggle room and escape hatches for 
senior members of government.  That’s what it’s all about and 
basically, we really haven’t changed much throughout history.  
States still pursue their national interests, their strategic interests, 
their power and wealth goals, and these prevail.  International 
criminal justice is not yet one of the values of an international, 
globalized society and until it becomes part of it, and until states 
realize that these values are not incompatible with their interests, that 
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their interests can best be achieved through the pursuit of these 
values, we will continue to see a perpetuation of a conflict between 
Realpolitik and international criminal justice.   
And through this conflict you now see how in a sense this 
amorphous thing we call the international community has now 
realized that it has to pay some lip service to international criminal 
justice.  And so what it does is, it says, “How do we co-opt 
international criminal justice?  What is it that you want?  You want 
international criminal tribunals? Okay, we’ll give you international 
tribunals.  For Yugoslavia and Rwanda it’s going to be limited to 
these conflicts and then it’s going to be subject to the Security 
Council and then it’s going to be subject to Special Modalities in 
terms of funding.” Then we’re going to come to the point and say, 
“You know what, it’s time for you guys to go.”  And then we’re 
going to be able to say, “You know, we gave you the international 
tribunals.  Look at what they did…We have Miloševiü!”  And then 
you stop for a minute and you say, “Now wait a minute. Wait, wait, 
wait… Let’s run this thing backwards. When did we get Miloševiü?  
After Dayton?  After he started bombing Kosovo?” Is there any hint 
that in the event that he was not going to be that stupid to go bomb 
Kosovo he could’ve gotten a pass?  I don’t know.  I’m not into the 
latest developments of the Court, but I have to ask myself the 
question, why aren’t Miloševiü’s assets seized?  Why are Mrs. 
Miloševiü and his son living happily in Russia, spending the money?  
And, by the way, how did these blood diamonds circulate?  
Something about DeBeers company buying them and then the 
money was sort of nicely laundered again through Swiss banks 
which allowed certain Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarus arms dealers 
to be able to provide the arms by transshipping them through Dubai.  
You look at all of that and you say, “Now wait a minute.  Where is 
the will of the international community to connect the dots that 
would make it more difficult for the commission of international 
crimes?” 
But who is going to speak for the 92 million people who have 
been killed in the last sixty years?  92 million, and it’s not one or 
two. Think about it.  It’s almost incredible; it’s almost impossible for 
the human mind to absorb this enormous number.  And you have to 
pause and see that the situation that we face is a situation in which 
those of us who are going to be committed to international criminal 
justice as part of human rights have to come to the realization that 
international criminal justice is a way of enforcing human rights, 
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much as in domestic law.  We have to come to recognize that the use 
of criminal law is the enforcement of other social interests by harsher 
means than by having simple civil damages or sanctions.  We also 
are going to have to come to the realization that we have many dots 
in the firmament of international criminal law.  And these dots aren’t 
connected.  In less than 100 years, we have adopted over 285 
international conventions on international criminal law.  They’re 
divided into 28 different categories, and again I’m coming back to 
what I was saying in terms of the legislative policy concerning 
terrorism.  Why don’t we have a comprehensive convention? Why 
don’t we have a comprehensive mechanism?  Why don’t we have 
connections between organized crime and money laundering and 
conflicts of a non-international character and international character 
and so on and so forth?  If the purpose of the international legislative 
policy is to minimize the crimes, to achieve a higher level of 
prevention, to produce a higher level of deterrence, and as a result to 
minimize the harm, we have to focus on these connections.   
Shortly after I finished my function at the Rome conference 
(1998), which Professor Scheffer addressed, I found myself 
appointed without being asked, and unknowingly, by the 
Commission on Human Rights as the Independent Expert on Victim 
Compensation.  So I went to Geneva, still with a little bit of idealism 
left in me and forgetting all of the lessons that I should have learned 
in my many prior years and said, “Oh, wow, now we’re going to 
move ahead and there will be a U.N. resolution on the protection of 
victims.”  After two years we produced a very viable declaration on 
the rights of the victims of crime and compensation.  And this was 
just before the U.N. conference on racism in Durban.  And suddenly 
the U.S. came and said, “Wait a minute.  You can’t go any further 
with that,” and marshaled all of the European countries and said, 
“Do you realize that if this is adopted, then in America all of the 
former slaves will ask for compensation?  And you know what, you 
Europeans have acted as colonizers in all of these African and Asian 
countries, so you too are going to be exposed.” So suddenly, totally 
unexpectedly, I found a huge coalition of countries opposed to the 
work that I was doing, and it took from 2002 until 2006, four years 
of diplomatic efforts, to get the resolution adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly in 2006.  Every one of these governments made a 
statement saying, “This is not mandatory. This is not binding. This is 
soft law.” Their aim was to minimize it.  
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One of the provisions I put in was that part of the rights of 
victims is their right to see people who committed the crimes 
investigated, and if the investigation produces sufficient evidence, 
for them to be prosecuted and punished.  That was the most hard 
fought provision.  You want money, it’s okay.  But don’t come 
seeking prosecution.  Of course, built in that little section dealing 
with prosecution was the removal of impunities of heads of states, 
and that really hurt.  We have to develop new thinking.  It’s not very 
innovative, it’s not very imaginative. We’re still fighting the same 
old battles under new forms and new shapes.  We have to continue to 
support existing international institutions, existing international 
tribunals, and move them ahead, but we have to also realize that 
within a short period of time we may find ourselves with nothing 
else but the ICC as the only gig in town.  And we all have our 
concerns, either because of the slow start of the ICC or because of a 
variety of decisions by its prosecutors.  We all have to be also 
concerned about the possible future politicization of the ICC.   
I think the future is going to rely more on what is called the 
complementarity approach to international criminal justice—how do 
we strengthen national capacity and develop national criminal justice 
systems?  And you know we unfortunately do not see many 
developed countries in the world, such as the U.S. and those within 
the E.U. and others, putting resources into developing national 
capacity-building and national legal systems in order to have these 
national legal systems take over the task of prosecution.  
Realpolitik prevails.  I hope you will forgive me if I conclude 
with this contemporary note.  As you can see, even events in Egypt 
demonstrate that the military junta is going to continue to remain in 
power.  This military junta was established in 1952 and it continues. 
It is engaged in massive human rights violations and torture in 
Egypt.  The United States government has not seen fit to condemn 
these practices.  On the contrary it has supported it.  It is quite likely 
that the army will use its military forces to repress the popular 
uprising.  If that’s the case, it will be a violation of U.S. law because 
U.S. law prohibits the use of U.S. military assistance for a violation 
of human rights.  But neither the President nor the Secretary of State 
mentioned anything in their announcement on the subject.   
So, in a sense it is business as usual.  Egypt has been the 
recipient of extraordinary renditions and torture on behalf of and for 
the United States.  Many countries continue their practices of torture. 
The United States claims that it upholds its laws, its Constitution, 
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and international laws, and yet we have seen the institutionalization 
of torture by senior officials in the prior administration.  We have 
seen a number of lawyers violate their code of ethics by producing 
legal opinions that are contrary to international and domestic law.  It 
is not only a question of Guantanamo with over 800 people who 
have been tortured.  It’s an estimated 150,000 people who have been 
tortured in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last nine years in addition to 
the extraordinary renditions.  In this context, an estimated 200 
people have been killed under torture, at least those we know of.  
None of the lawyers have been brought to bar, even to question their 
ethics.  
Not only have the architects of the Bush Administration’s 
torture been allowed to pass, they’ve been allowed to brag about it 
on television, to put it in books, and to sell it and make money out of 
it and to get away with it.  And those who perpetrated the torture, 
with the exception of a few lowly soldiers who received minor 
disciplinary action, were not prosecuted.  Nobody even speaks of the 
doctors and medical professionals who participated in furthering the 
torture and prolonged the suffering of those who had been tortured. 
If we let this go by, then what else are we going to let go by in terms 
of violations of our international legal obligations, of our 
Constitutions, of our criminal laws under U.S.C. Title 18, of our 
criminal laws under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?  It is so 
tragic that this is happening, and it is even worse that American 
public opinion remains so indifferent about it.  When we look back 
at the history of atrocity crimes, it is not so much the few who 
commit the crimes that count, but it is the many who remain 
indifferent to these crimes that make them possible.   
